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NOTE
THE SCARLET LETTER "A": AIDS IN
A COMPUTER SOCIETY
I.

INTRODUCTION

The logistics of reporting and ultimately tracking the names and
medical records of AIDS victims/carriers will inevitably entail the construction of an AIDS database to more efficiently analyze and control
the medical diagnosis information.' Such a database would likely contain the AIDS carrier's name, medical history, previous and present
sexual contacts, and certain other extremely personal characteristics
(i.e., drug use) which researchers feel might prove helpful, at least in an
explanatory sense, in tracking the likely causes and spread of the disease. This Note explores the question of whether creating such a
database would be prudent given the current state of computer-match-

ing as well as the minimal safeguards available against unwarranted access to the database. More specifically, the Note focus is upon the
desirability of, and the legal issues raised by, the creation and maintenance of a state or federal computer database which would contain the
names of individuals who have tested "seropositive" 2 but have not yet
been diagnosed as having AIDS.
1. "Like the credit industry, hospitals and insurance companies maintained manual
data collection systems throughout most of the twentieth century. Computerized information retrieval systems are products of the last two decades." Note, Toward a Uniform

Right to Medical Records: A Proposalfor a Model PatientAccess and Information Practices Statute, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1349, 1354 (1983) [hereinafter Uniform Right] (citing PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 58

n.3 (1977); Telephone interview with Jim Corbett, Gen. Counsel, MIB (Dec. 8, 1982)). The
Center for Disease Control (C.D.C.) in Atlanta established an AIDS database in mid-1983;
this computer surveillance system enables them "to monitor national AIDS trends more
efficiently."

R. SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON 351 (1987).

In addition, eight states currently use some method of tracking those who test seropositive for AIDS, and as the nation's hysteria grows, more states are likely to follow suit.
L.A. Times, Sept. 20, 1987, at 20, col. 6.
2. See infra text accompanying note 9.
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BACKGROUND ON AIDS

Every day, Danny Joe Ware closes his eyes and prays that people
won't be as cruel to his children as they have been to him.
Just 24 years old, the father of three is dying of AIDS in Dallas,
the city to which he fled recently from his home in Kilgore, Texas. He
has on different occasions been pelted with rocks and jumped by three
men, who shattered a beer bottle over his head, broke his nose and
bruised some ribs.
"What are you doing?" Mr. Ware recalls screaming during the attack, too weak to defend himself. "Killing AIDS," replied one of the
men. "And when we're done with you, we're going to kill your wife
3
and kids, just in case they've got it.
4
Such violent scenarios are, in part, a fearful response to a virus
5
that kills. AIDS was initially labeled a gay disease-"gay cancer."
Common sense has prevailed, however, and it is generally accepted that
"the HIV virus, which causes AIDS, knows nothing of homosexuality or
drug abuse."'6 The HIV virus is a delicate virus which has not been
shown to survive in an airborne state. Thus, it is believed to be transmitted only through blood or semen.7
It is important to distinguish between testing positive8 for the HIV
virus and having AIDS. Testing seropositive 9 indicates that one has
3. Wall St. J., Nov. 13, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
4. The official name of the AIDS virus is "HIV," although it has also been referred
to as "LAV" and "HTLV-III."
5. See generally R. SHILTS, supra note 1.
6. Wall St. J., Nov. 13, 1987, at 6, col. 1.
AIDS is by no means restricted to homosexuals. Of the more than 40,000 reported cases of AIDS in the U.S., 65% involve homosexual or bisexual men; 17%
intravenous drug abusers. The rest are people sexually involved with infected individuals; hemophiliacs, and others who contracted the disease through contaminated blood. Federal statistics from the Centers of Disease Control report 595
cases of AIDS in children under the age of 13.
Id. at 1, col. 1.
See also AIDS: Everything You and Your Family Need to Know But Were Afraid to
Ask (Home Box Office, Inc., Cable Television Broadcast, Oct. 12, 1987) [hereinafter AIDS]
(statement of Dr. C. Everett Koop, U.S. Surgeon General).
7. Note, Reportability of Exposure to the AIDS Virus: An Equal Protection Analysis, 7 CARDOZO L. REv. 1103, 1103 (1986) [hereinafter Reportability]. See also AIDS, supra
note 6.
8. "Testing positive" is synonymous with the terms "testing seropositive" and "testing HIV positive."
9. As noted in the AIDS Project L.A. Newspaper, AIDS is detected through the use
of blood tests:
Originally introduced in 1985 as part of an emergency effort to safeguard the nation's blood supply, the test to identify HIV infected blood is fairly simple. There
are three laboratory versions of the test available, commonly referred to as the
ELISA (Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent Assay), the Western Blot and the IFA
(Immuno Fluorescent Assay). Because the ELISA was developed to protect the
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been infected with the virus, or more specifically, that the virus has
been present in the individual's bloodstream long enough (generally
less than six months) 10 for the body to trigger production of antibodies
to the virus." However,
a positive antibody test result does not, by itself, indicate that a person
has AIDS. The current Centers for Disease Control definition of a person with AIDS requires three things: (1) infection with the virus, (2) a
lowered immune system, and (3) the presence of at least
one of a
12
number of opportunistic infections associated with AIDS.
Regardless of the niceties associated with this distinction between testing seropositive for the AIDS virus and actually having AIDS, a positive
test result renders the individual who possess the AIDS antibody as po13
tentially infectious as the patient who is actually suffering from AIDS.
When AIDS does occur, the HIV virus attacks, and ultimately destroys, the body's natural immune system thereby preventing persons
nation's blood supply from contaminated or infected blood, it is highly sensitive,
and often shows numerous "false positive" test results. For this reason, it is essential that blood showing a positive result with the ELISA be retested with the
more specific (and costly) Western Blot or IFA to confirm the actual positive
status.
Pickett, Issues in Testing: A Matter of Informed Choice, AIDS Project L.A. Newspaper,
Fall, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
Objections to ELISA as a diagnostic tool have two bases. First, the test is not reliable in most populations. The test's sensitivity-its accuracy in correctly identifying persons exposed to HTLV-III-is high. The test's specificity-its accuracy
in correctly identifying persons not exposed to HTLV-III-is relatively low. This
combination results in a great number of positive results; unfortunately, many of
them are false. The test is very effective among the urban gay male population
(nearly 100%), less so among IV drug users, and highly inaccurate (30-35%) in
low-risk populations.
Reportability,supra note 7, at 1111 (citation omitted).
See also Weiss, Goedert, Sarngadharan, Bodner, The AIDS Seroepidemiology Collaborative Working Group, Gallo & Blattner, Screening Test for HTL V-I Antibodies, 253 J.
A.M.A. 221 (1985); A. FETTNER & W. CHECK, THE TRUTH ABOUT AIDS 265 (rev. ed. 1985).
10. "None of these tests are totally conclusive as it can take from two weeks to six
months to produce the HIV antibody after the person has been infected. This is referred
to as a window period." Pickett, supra note 9, at 1, col. 1.
11. Id. "There is thought to be a long period (up to seven years) between [testing positive to HIV] and development of AIDS ....
[D]ue to the brief history of the disease, the
possibility of longer incubation periods cannot be excluded." Comment, Protecting Confidentiality in the Effort to Control AIDS, 24 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 315, 317 (1987) [hereinafter
Comment] (citing Update: AIDS-United States, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP.,
Jan. 17, 1987, at 17).
12. Pickett, supra note 9, at 1, col. 2; see generally R. SHILTS, supra note 1.
13. "[Tlhere is medical agreement that an HIV infected person is potentially infectious to others, [so] a positive test result brings a burden to bear upon that individual to
not engage in behavior that could spread the virus to others (e.g., unprotected sexual activities, [intravenous] needle-sharing, pregnancy)." Pickett, supra note 9, at 1, col. 2.
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with the syndrome from fighting off even the weakest infections. 14 It is
a disease for which "[t]here is no vaccine and no cure. ' 15 Many people
with AIDS die within eighteen months of diagnosis. Most are dead
within three years. 16 "[A] San Francisco Public Health Department
study found that 78% of a group of HIV positive gay males developed
signs of immune-system damage within 6 1/2 years of their exposure to
the virus."'1 7 "[This] San Francisco study [also] indicated that AIDS may
be seven times as likely to develop in the sixth or seventh year after
infection as in the first or second year."' 8 Moreover, the "AIDS fatality
rate-the likelihood that a person with AIDS will die from an AIDS related disease is 100%."'19 Among patients diagnosed prior to July 1984,
seventy-one percent are reported to have died.20 Today, between 1 million and 1.5 million Americans are already infected with the AIDS virus.21 Of these Americans, perhaps 250,000 to 500,000 already show
signs of AIDS-Related Complex, or ARC. 22
Despite the bleak consensus that no cure for AIDS presently exists,
"[s]everal experimental treatments appear to slow the virus' progression in infected individuals and may enhance the survival prospects of
HIV carriers. '23 One AIDS researcher has even predicted that
"[w]ithin 12 to 18 months, we will be able to arrest the disease at
whatever stage it is in except for people who are very sick." 24 While
such optimism remains rare when discussing AIDS, "recent medical reports confirm that the extraordinarily expensive Burroughs Wellcome
14. Reportability,supra note 7, at 1106 (citing A. FETrNER & W. CHECK, THE TRuTH
ABouT AIDS 265 (rev. ed. 1985)); see also Comment, supra note 11, at 316.
15. Reportability,supra note 7, at 1103. See also Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1988, at 17, col. 4.
16. Reportability, supra note 7, at 1106 (citing AIDS: Chapter One (WGBH Educational Foundation Television Broadcast, Feb. 12, 1985) (transcript, NOVA Series No.
1205)).
17. Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1988, at 1, col. 1. "Some 30% developed AIDS, 21% ARC.
Some 27% had persistent generalized lymphadenopathy (swollen lymph nodes), a condition sometimes classified as ARC." Id.
18. Id. (emphasis added).
19. Reportability,supra note 7, at 1106 (citing Krim, AIDS: The Challenge to Science
and Medicine, in AIDS: THE EMERGING ETHICAL DILEMMAS 2, 3 (Hastings Center Rep.,
Spec. Supp., Aug. 1985). See also Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1988, at 1, col. 1 (quoting New York
Health Commissioner David Axelrod: "Virtually all those infected are doomed.").
See also Reidinger, A Question of Balance: Policing the AIDS Epidemic, A.B.A. J.,
June 1, 1987, at 69.
20. Comment, supra note 11, at 315 (citing Update: AIDS-United States, MORBIDITY
& MORTALITY WEEKLY REP., Jan. 17, 1986, at 17).
21. Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1988, at 1, col. 1 (citing the Federal Center for Disease Control
in Atlanta).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. (quoting Dr. Bernard Bihari, physician and AIDS researcher at the State University of New York).
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Co. drug, AZT, prolongs the life of AIDS and ARC patients-especially
if they [begin treatment] in the early stages of the disease." 25 Many experts agree that "[tihe use of AZT treatments is resulting in significant
reduction in progression to AIDS, hospitalization and death."' 6 In addition, recent experimentation has shown that injecting a more advanced
AIDS patient with blood plasma taken from an HIV positive individual
not showing ARC or related disease symptoms, prolongs the life of the
advanced patient.27 Thus, while there may be no present cure for
AIDS, the sooner a seropositive individual is treated, the better that individual's prospectsfor survival.
II.

THE BENEFITS OF REPORTING NAMES AND CREATING
AN AIDS DATABASE

Certain methods28 have traditionally been employed to combat infectious diseases such as syphilis, tuberculosis, and smallpox. These
methods-recording and tracking patient records-have also been instrumental for epidemiological purposes as they have "demonstrat[ed]
the link between cigarette smoking and lung cancer; the link between
mothers who took diethylstilbestrol (DES) during pregnancy and the
risk of vaginal cancer to their daughters; and the link between women's
use of estrogens for menopausal symptoms and the increased risk of endometrial or uterine cancer. '29 A frustrated Executive Director of Colorado's Department of Health stated that:
If we can't use these methods [to combat AIDS], we are doing substantially less than we know how to do .... There are tried and true methodologies which have worked in the control of communicable disease
before. To the extent they are applicable, they should be utilized .....
25. Id. at 17, col. 4.
26. Id. (quoting Dr. Bernard Bihari, physician and AIDS researcher at the State University of New York). See also CBS Evening News Report (August 17, 1989, 5:00 PM) (report by Dr. Howard Torman). The report asserted the following: AZT slows down the
progression of AIDS. Early AZT therapy has very clear benefits-all participants in a National Institute of Health (N.I.H.) study showed less than 500 T4 cells, and one half the
usual rate of progression to ARC or other advanced diseases. Moreover, the N.I.H. study
showed that AZT has relatively minor side effects--3% of those studied were nauseated.
Id.
27. Apparently this type of treatment is effective because the HIV positive individual,
not showing ARC or other advanced symptoms, has blood rich in HIV antibodies. See
NBC Evening News Reports (Aug. 24-27, 1989).
28. "Traditional public health measures involve testing by name, reporting to the
state health agency all positive cases, tracing and notifying others who might have been
exposed and, when necessary, quarantining the most dangerously contagious cases." L.A.
Times, Sept. 20, 1987, at A20, col. 1.
29. Uniform Right, supra note 1, at 1353 n.30 (citing Privacy of Medical Records:
Hearingson H.R. 2979 and H.R 3444 Before the Subcomm of the House Comm on Gov't
Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 211, 479-82 (1980)).
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Only if we identify and track cases by name .. .could health authorities accurately follow the epidemiology of an infection. With names,
they could track down individuals who do not return to clinics after
testing positive. They could trace the infected person's partners. They
30
could eliminate duplications in counts.
In sum, "[it is antithetical to the practice of medicine; it is antithetical

to the practice of public health, not to use names.... [T]hat's what pub31
lic health disease control is all about.
Regardless of the proven medical benefits these methods provide,
the questions remain concerning whether the medical treatment of
AIDS can be likened to the treatment of syphilis, tuberculosis, and
smallpox, all of which have shorter incubation periods and can be
treated effectively and whether sufficient epidemiological concerns exist to warrant intrusion into an AIDS victim's privacy. While it is true
that a diagnosis of AIDS may not occur within six years of the initial
date of infection, an individual will evidence the tell-tale antibodies to
AIDS (i.e., test seropositive for AIDS and be as potentially infectious to
others) within the first six months after infectious contact.3 2 Given that
the relative incubation period for syphilis, another sexually transmitted
disease (for which contact tracing is permitted), is no less than three
months,3 3 the length of incubation argument, used to distinguish contact tracing for AIDS from the tracing of diseases such as syphilis, appears tenuous.
Opponents of contact tracing also urge that because there is no cure
for AIDS, contact tracing will offer those individuals located through
the trace no treatment but only despair. However, as previously discussed, the sooner a patient begins treatment for the disease the better
the patient's chance of surviving for a longer period of time; early diagnosis offers concrete medical benefits. s 4 For example, treatments in the
form of early analysis, stepped-up hygiene programs, and drugs which
hinder disease progression, such as AZT, have proven effective in many
individuals diagnosed as seropositive.3 5 In addition, the sooner an individual is made aware of his/her likely infected status, the sooner that
30.

L.A. Times, Sept. 20, 1987, at 20, col. 1.

31. Id. at col. 2.
32. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
33. During the first stage of syphilis, when chancre sores appear, the blood will not
be infected so a conclusive test for syphilis cannot be conducted. It is only after the appearance and disappearance of chancre sores that a conclusive test for syphilis can be administered. This sequence of events takes at least three months from the initial infection.
Telephone conversation with the Los Angeles Health Department, North East Health
Center (Feb. 22, 1988) (confirmed the accuracy of U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
WELFARE, SYPHILIS: A SYNOPsIs 45 (1968)).

34. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
35. Id.
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person can be counseled to act responsibly toward future sexual partners and the sooner past partners may be targeted for treatment.
With respect to epidemiological concerns, computer-matching has
long served as a vital aid to medical research. "[F]or example, although
medical records are of the most sensitive nature, studies of cancer in relation to air pollution might well find it useful to process medical and
demographic data together in the interests of scientific research."
Similar studies could be applied to AIDS to discern why some seropositive individuals' status ripens to AIDS earlier than other HIV positive
persons.
Regardless of whether contact tracing is desired for the purpose of
treatment or to alleviate epidemiological concerns, its use in the AIDS
context has become highly controversial3 7 and has met with fervent opposition,3 8 primarily from the gay community which fears having, in essence, a roster made of its members.3 9 These fears confound some
health officials who not only assert that contact tracing has been done
for years, 40 but also that the gay community has been the target of some
41
of that tracing.
The current confidential status of HIV-positive individuals also
places many health care workers in troubling situations. Health care
providers "find themselves in the position of watching silently as unaware individuals come into contact with people the health officials
know are carrying the AIDS virus." 42 "[A] nurse epidemiologist ... has
watched as doctors and nurses wheel patients into surgery, patients she
knows are carrying the AIDS virus. Although her colleagues might be
'43
making contact with the patient's blood, [she] cannot warn them.
Most horrifying is the fact that "[a] ... physician.., has treated a bisex36. Ruggles, On the Needs and Values of Data Banks, 53 MINN. L. REv. 211, 220
(1968).
37. Contact tracing is "the hunt for past sexual partners of someone who has developed AIDS. The chief goal of contact tracing is to let people know they have been exposed to, and may have been infected by the virus." Reidinger, supra note 19, at 70.
38. "Gay men come off the wall when this idea of contact tracing is done." L.A.
Times, Sept. 20, 1987, at A22, col. 2 (quoting K. Gebbie, Director of the Oregon State
Health Division).
39. See generally R. SHILTS, supra note 1.
40. L.A. Times, Sept. 20, 1987, at A22, col. 2. However, "[i]n traditional contact tracing with diseases where there is a cure, the initial 'index case' can remain anonymous.
With AIDS, though, health officials are not really protecting a third party unless they
identify who exposed them to the virus. Otherwise, the contact might continue." Id.
41. Id. at col. 2. "It's been done for years. We have a couple of investigators whose
specialty is tracing syphilis through the gay community. I have drawers full of stuff like
that and nobody has ever asked to see it." Id. (quoting K. Gebbie, Director of the Oregon
State Health Division).
42. Id.
43. Id.
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ual AIDS patient who wouldn't tell his wife, as well as a male prostitute
with AIDS who wouldn't cease his sexual activity."" Furthermore, if a
doctor were to warn his colleagues of an individual's HIV-positive status, even for the protection of noninfected patients, legal liability could
45

result.

Regardless of the "confidentiality" question raised by contact tracing, the use of a computer database to maintain lists of HIV-positive individuals would lend the speed, efficiency, reduced research costs, and
powerful statistical and database-matching capabilities inherent in computer technology46 to the study and control of the AIDS epidemic. With
respect to medical treatment, for example, contact tracing for syphilis
currently enables Colorado to "call 49 other states and get an instanta'47
neous response to find that individual and get him into treatment.
Unfortunately, this can be done "for AIDS contacts in something like
'48
only eight or ten states.
Also, a database could function as an extremely efficient means of
monitoring the spread of AIDS by identifying HIV-positive individuals
who are irresponsibly spreading the disease. While the use of contact
tracing would not, in and of itself, force seropositive individuals to act
responsibly, its existence might deter 49 such conduct and illuminate irresponsible parties for treatment or punishment, as the legislature and
courts deem appropriate. 5°
In conclusion, the construction of an HIV-positive/AIDS database
would not be a panacea to the disease, but rather an effective way of
documenting its spread, getting traced individuals tested and, if in44. Id.
45. See Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1988, at A17, col. 2. A Florida medical technician lost his
job when his doctor divulged his positive blood test status to his employers-administrators at the hospital where the technician worked-in order to protect the hospital's patients. The medical technician has since gained similar employment in San Francisco and
has filed suit against his doctor for unlawful disclosure. Id.
46. "Largely because of the computer, scholars now are increasingly able to process
the available data and base their hypotheses on mathematical models rather than on 'intuitive feeling and casual empiricism."' A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY, COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND DOSSIERS 36 (1971) [hereinafter ASSAULT] (quoting Ruggles,
On the Needs and Values of Databanks, 53 MINN. L. REV. 211, 216 (1968)).
47. L.A. Times, Sept. 20, 1987, at A20, col. 2.
48. Id.
49. Issues still exist as to whether one could realistically deter an already dying individual, and as to whether that individual would be alive when his irresponsible acts are
discovered. However, recall that while the sexual partner might not actually develop
AIDS for over six years, that same partner -can conclusively be tested for production of
the HIV antibody within six months, and often as little as two weeks. See, e.g., Pickett,
supra note 9, at 1, col. 1.
50. Should the seropositive individual continue to infect other persons, this would become apparent when the newly infected individual participates in a contact trace.
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fected, treated at the earliest stage possible in order to best enjoy scientific advances.
Many urge that contact tracing should not be used because it cannot effectively stop the spread of AIDS; there is no cure of AIDS and
the incubation period is quite long. In addition, they insist that "the inclusion of victims' names in official reports does not significantly contribute to research, counseling, or treatment, while it does increase the
chances of infringing victims' privacy interests," 5' 1 given the relatively
short incubation period with respect to the development of AIDS antibodies, as opposed to AIDS itself.
However, as previously argued, contact tracing does produce advantages connected with early treatment of the disease and its symptoms,
as well as the possibility of policing and documenting the spread of the
disease via the inclusion of seropositive names in a state held database.
Ultimately, the benefits to be gained from contact tracing must be
weighed against the privacy interests and other constitutional rights of
HIV-positive individuals.
THE PROBLEMS WITH REPORTING NAMES
Several arguments have been advanced against the reporting of the
names of AIDS victims. These arguments will be outlined below.
A.

REPORTING NAMES UNDULY BURDENS THOSE WHO TEST POSITIVE

This argument hinges inextricably on both the equal protection and
privacy arguments discussed below. The burdens associated with reporting seropositive names include: the fear of loss of employment and
insurance; the fear of difficulties in receiving medical care; the fear of
physical bodily harm; and the fear of a lack of control over where such
sensitive personal information flows.
Given that the medical record is "a prime source of information for
' 52
decision making and control in a variety of nontreatment contexts,
51. Comment, supra note 11, at 339.
52. Uniform Right, supra note 1, at 1353. For example:
"[Tihe medical record has assumed primary importance... in insurance company
assessments of an applicant's eligibility for health and life insurance. The medical record also plays a central role in insurance claims processing and in public
and private efforts to detect medical fraud. Private employers, educational institutions, credit investigators, and law enforcement agencies also use personal medical information."
Id. at 1353-54 (citing Privacy of Medical Records: Hearings on H.R. 2979 and HR 3444
Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations,96th Cong., 1st Sess. 219,
579 (1980); PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 279 (1977)).
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placing the information that an individual tested seropositive into a national database could have dramatic consequences.
First, both insurance companies and employers have a financial interest in knowing whether an employee or prospective employee has
tested HIV-positive. "Insurance companies. . . have a strong interest in
discovering the identities of potential or confirmed AIDS victims because they are loathe to cover the astronomical medical bills of such
policy applicants. ' 53 Similarly, "[e]mployers are also interested in
knowing whether present or prospective employees have AIDS in order
to avoid increased group insurance premiums or possible infection of
other employees." 54
Not only could the news of testing seropositive cause the loss of employment and insurance, 55 but "[a] relatively small number of doctors
say they won't treat AIDS patients. Some say they are afraid they will
cut themselves during surgery and thereby become exposed to contaminated blood." 56
As if these consequences are not sufficiently damaging, many peo57
ple react violently to already vulnerable AIDS victims.
[V]iolence, which remains a fringe reaction to sufferers of acquired immune deficiency syndrome, reflects another virulent disease, one that
53. Comment, supra note 11, at 320. "Mhe typical AIDS patient needed $100,000 in
medical care." R. SHILTS, supra note 1, at 469.
54. Comment, supra note 11, at 320. "When the National Gay Rights Advocates
asked the nation's 1000 biggest companies whether employee medical plans covered
AIDS-related expenses, one anonymous answer read: 'Just enough to defray the cost of
the bullet.'" Wall St. J., Nov. 13, 1987, at 6, col. 2.
55. See also Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1988, at 17, col. 1. The article includes a brief story
illuminating the fear of job and insurance loss: "'I am perfectly up front about being gay,'
says a bartender, 'but I'd lose my job tomorrow if my boss knew I tested positive.' Already suffering some ARC symptoms, he says he has absorbed nearly $4,000 in medical
bills rather than file a tell-tale insurance claim." Id.
56. Wall St. J., Nov. 13, 1987, at 6, col. 2. However, "Arthur Caplan, a director of the
center for biomedical ethics at the University of Minnesota in Minneapolis, believes that
doctors and nurses who refuse AIDS patients do so out of disapproval. 'They know how
to deal with violent patients and infectious diseases like hepatitis.... It's more than fear.
They're making a value . . .judgment about AIDS victims. They're saying they won't
treat people [they find] disgusting.'" Id. at col. 3. Furthermore, "[t]he handful of healthcare workers who appear to have become infected in the course of their work were
splashed either in the mouth or in a cut with the blood of infected patients. A researcher
who became infected was working with an extremely high concentration of the virus and
had abrasions on his hand. In all such cases, the possibility of sexual or drug-related
transmission can't be absolutely ruled out, either. When sex and drugs are involved, people don't always tell the truth." Id. at col. 1.
57. Id. at 1, col. 1. "Gay-rights groups note that physical attacks against homosexuals
have risen sharply since the disease that came to be called AIDS was first publicized in
1981. The National Gay and Lesbian Task Force says it studies suggest that 63% of such
assaults now are related in some way to the emotions AIDS raises." Id.
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may threaten America's moral fabric: hatred and fear. Practically
every day, the news brings word of yet another senseless response to
AIDS-from the Florida minister who bars from church three hemophiliac children carrying the virus, to the Texas man who shoots his
nephew to death in the belief he has AIDS.5s
For those who manage to escape the overwhelming consequences of
insurance loss, job loss, lack of medical care, or violence, there is little
chance of escaping the stigma which tends to attach to AIDS victims:
Being a poor person is unfortunate, being a leper is unclean. It is bad
to be sick. And our society makes value judgments about people on the
basis of the state of their health that it does not make on the state of
their finances .... A person will be more hurt by words getting about
59
that he has an illness than that he has no money.
Computer technology, to a certain degree, tends to validate these
fears 6° because of the ease of access to the computer's stored information, in combination with the computer's "insatiable appetite for infor-

mation, [an] image of infallibility, and [an] inability to forget anything
that's stored in it... ."61 The crux of the fears concerning large federal
data bases is that "[t]he technology for information collection, storage,
and retrieval has outpaced the technology for safeguarding databanks of
personal information."6 2 These fears are well-founded; "stories are legion about the fifteen-year-old computer wizard who can crack the most
secure computer system. Computer security is largely unregulated, and
the penalties for stealing personal data are unclear." 63
Even when theft or wrongdoing associated with data files is negligible, problems relating to the data input and use of data can still arise.
For example, "[n]ames in medical records have been confused, illnesses
have been ascribed to the wrong person, and unsolicited and misleading
comments by doctors about a patient's sexual health have been in58. Id.
59. Uniform Right, supra note 1, at 1357 (quoting the transcript of President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral
Research at 436 (testimony of Dr. Robert Gorden, M.D., M.H.S., Special Ass't to the Dir.,
National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Md.)).
60. "Despite ... freedom-generating prospects, the scientific advances in data accumulation remain a double-edged sword. If the new technology is properly used, society
benefits; if it is abused, it can become a tool of enslavement by those who control data
flow." Peck, Extending the ConstitutionalRight to Privacy in the New Technological Age,
12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 893, 897 (1984).
61. ASSAULT, supra note 46, at 17.
62. Shattuck, In the Shadow of 1984: National Identification Systems, ComputerMatching, and Privacy in the United States, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 993-94 (citing SUBCOMM. ON TRANSPORTATION, AVIATION, AND MATERIALS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY AND

PRIVACY 17-19, 24-27 (Comm. Print 1984)).
63. Id.
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cluded." 64 Also, the results of information taken out of context, as is
apt to happen with computer data, can be devastating6s
The above computer-related fears are all based on problems generated by human error or deception and the abuse of computer technology, rather than on problems that are intrinsic to computer use. 66
Arguably, appropriate safeguards could be developed to avoid many of
the undesirable results. For instance, with respect to fears of inaccurate
data entry, informational privacy could be effectively protected by
64. Uniform Right, supra note 1, at 1362-63 (citations omitted). False conclusions
caused by inaccuracy of files is a noteworthy risk:
According to a study initiated by the United States Office of Technology Assessment, only twelve percent of the criminal history record summaries routinely
transmitted from North Carolina to law enforcement and other agencies were
correct. The figures for California were slightly better, but still not encouraging:
nineteen percent. . . . Under these conditions, computer matching inevitably
leads to a proliferation of false information. Both the error and the implications
for the persons concerned are magnified.
Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an In~formation Society, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 707, 719 (citing
D. BURNHAM, THE RISE OF THE COMPUTER STATE 74 (1983); Bing, Data Protection and Social Policy, in BEYOND 1984: THE LAW AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN TOMORROW'S

SOCIETY 82, 89 (Council of Europe 1985) (proceedings of the 14th Colloquy on European
Law, Lisbon, Sept. 26-28, 1984); Shattuck, supra note 62, at 1001-04)).
65. An important
consequence of automated processing is the loss of context. The very moment
matching begins, the data are itemized and disconnected from their original collection situation. Yet neither hard facts nor judgments can be separated at will
from their context without distorting information. Consequently, every step towards routine processing accentuates the danger of misrepresentations and false
conclusions. The more complex a case, the greater the danger of an improper
result.
Simitis, supra note 64, at 718.
In New York, a middle-aged man was denied a taxi-driver's license when a computerized credit report showed that at thirteen he had been placed in a Massachusetts mental
institution. "What the files did not show was that he was an orphan and the institution
was the only home the state authorities could find for him for a period of four years."
Shattuck, supra note 62, at 994 (citing A. NEIER, DOSSIER 73-74 (1975)).
In general,
[c]omputer systems that handle personal information may inflict harm to data
subject in two significant ways: (1) by disseminating evidence of present or past
actions or associations to a wider audience than the individual anticipated when
he originally surrendered the information (deprivation of control over access),
and (2) by introducing factual or contextual inaccuracies in the data that create
an erroneous impression of the subject's actual conduct or achievements in the
minds of those to whom the information is exposed (deprivation of control over
accuracy).
ASSAULT, supra note 46, at 41 (citing Karst, The Files: Legal Controls Over the Accuracy of
Stored Personal Data, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 342, 343 (1966)).
66. Humans program and control computers. That is "the reality of our electronic
way of life rather than the popular image projected by Hal, the neurotic but domineering
computer in 2001: A Space Odyssey." ASSAULT, supra note 46, at 17 (1971). Similarly,
"machines are morally neutral, and it is only the men who, therefore, bear the responsibility for distinguishing between right and wrong." Id. at 37.

1990]

AIDS IN A COMPUTER SOCIETY

screening data before it is recorded. 67 Such data screening is especially
important given the frequent assertion by computer experts that "total
reliance on post-collection procedures may be too little, too late."' 6 In
the event that a discrepancy arises with respect to a medical file's contents, it is crucial that the AIDS system act promptly to resolve the dispute. The databank manager should identify and contact likely sources
of the disputed information and flag the information as questionable.
After reinvestigation, the manager should then re-record the current
status of that data. Investigations should be initiated and completed
within a reasonable period of time. Unverifiable or inaccurate data
should be promptly deleted and formal, sealed notices should be sent to
all recipients of the incorrect data. Where the information is verified
but incomplete, additional information should be included to clarify the
item, such as the fact of a recovery or an improvement in medical
69
condition.
With respect to protecting an AIDS database from improper access,
the solution to combatting human abuse will likely be more illusive.
Generally,
[t]he choice of an appropriate protective scheme depends upon the
character of the particular system's hardware and software, how much
storage and transmission security its data base is likely to need, and the
nature of both the user class and those who are likely to attempt to
gain access to the information without authorization ....
In addition,
since systems change their purposes and dimensions over time, it is
often impossible to predict the character of future security problems at
70
the initial stages of development.
67. See Uniform Right, supra note 1, at 1355-56.
These [databank] companies process a great number of requests for patient
medical information. When information is obtained from industry data exchanges rather than from the patient, the risk of a mishap multiplies. Each collection, report, and coding is a source of potential error. The Medical
Information Bureau (MIB), for example, does not verify its data with the original
source of the information. As a result, unless detected earlier, any incorrect data
that MIB provides can circulate throughout the entire insurance industry for as
many as seven years. Id.
Like many other information banks, the MIB does not directly verify any patient information sent to it. The accuracy of the programmed information depends, therefore, on the verification of the member reporting companies. The
source data is obtained from 'consumer reports.' Unless challenged by the medical consumer these reports are not confirmed by either the insurance applicant
himself or by the medical facility that originally released the information.
Id. at 1356 n.46 (citing Boyer, Computerized Medical Records and the Right to Privacy:
The Emerging Federal Response, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 37 (1975); Young, Your Health,
Their Business, NEW YORK, Oct. 27, 1980, at 39, 44)).
68. ASSAULT, supra note 46, at 264.

69. See Uniform Right, supra note 1, at 1356 n.47 (citing FTC News Release, Federal
Trade Commission (Nov. 17, 1982)).
70. ASSAULT, supra note 46, at 256. For instance, "In the case of remote-access sys-
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Regardless of the protective schemes employed, "experts have
flatly asserted that most program languages are easy to decipher, that
digital transmission of data 'does not provide any more privacy than...
Morse Code,' and that 'modest resources suffice to launch a low-level
infiltration effort." 71 Hence,
[t]he reality of the situation seems to be that once personal information
has been entered into a computerized file, the data subject, and, to a
lesser degree, the system's operators have little capacity to control who
will be able to peruse it ....
In a typical remote-access time-sharing
system, there are at least six points through which improper access to
the data may be gained or at which distortion of the information may
occur.

72

Thus, the burden of protecting the privacy interests of documented
AIDS carriers may be better accomplised by stringent regulation and
careful labor practices than through use of mechanical protective devices. 73 As one scholar has stated:
No set of technological devices or security procedures, however extensive or carefully designed they may be, can assure the integrity or privacy of the content of an information system. A computer's data store
essentially is a file, and whatever has been placed in it can be extracted
74
or altered by someone who knows the appropriate pathway to follow.
tems carrying sensitive personal information, a high level of protection against wiretapping can be achieved by coding the data or using 'scramblers' to garble them before

transmission and installing complementary devices in the authorized terminals to reconstitute the signal." Id. at 256-57. Similarly, "In the long run, the most promising method
of accurate user identification may be automatic scanning of fingerprints or voiceprints,
but these procedures are not yet available." Id. at 259. Such devices should be incorporated into the original hardware and software system design for optimum efficiency. Id.
at 259 (citing House Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy 126 (statement of
Paul Baran)). "One pragmatic consideration is that the cost of scrambling devices and the
development of completely break-proof codes is quite high." Id. at 257.
71. Id. at 42 (citing Allen, Danger Ahead! Safeguarding Your Computer, HARv. Bus.
REV., Nov.-Dec. 1968, at 97, 100 (quoting Petersen & Turn, System Implications of Information Policy, 30 AFIPS CONF. PRoc. 291, 298 (1967))).
72. Id. at 42 (citing Ware, Security and Privacy in Computer Systems, 30 AFIPS
CONF. PRoc. 279 (1967)). For instance, as if straight from James Bond, "[Tihere is some
evidence that computer equipment radiates when in operation and that by using eavesdropping techniques the emanations can be captured, reconstituted in their original
machine-readable format, and then deciphered. To guard against this possibility, the
physical surroundings... can be shielded with protective materials .... " Id. at 256.
73. ASSAULT, supra note 46, at 263.

74. Id. at 263 (citing House Hearingson the Computer and Invasion of Privacy 126
(statement of Paul Baran)).
Occasionally, medical record disclosures are authorized neither by the patient nor
by statute. In 1975, the Denver District Attorney and a grand jury discovered
that a private investigative reporting service had been engaging in a nationwide
medical information theft ring involving medical information reports on almost
2000 unsuspecting citizens. The firm boasted a 99% success rate in acquiring unconsented-to disclosure of medical information. Purchasers of this information
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With respect to labor concerns:
[e]ffective technical and procedural safeguards, combined with inputoutput controls, although vital prerequisites to maintaining the security
and factual reliability of computerized information, are not sufficient
by themselves. Even the most sophisticated set of mechanical and administrative regulations can be undermined by people working within
the system and by outsiders who gain access illicitly. In the long run,
those who live on intimate terms with databases and the technology
may prove to be an even more dangerous group than malicious or
profit-seeking interlopers, despite their lack of personal interest in the
informational content of the material in their care. Thus, it would be
sheer folly to treat the technicians who design and operate computer
systems as a brahmin caste whose very act or decision is presumed so75
cially desirable and beyond review.

In summary,
[p]rivacy-oriented technical safeguards must be supported by workable
regulations designed to prevent people from bypassing the security devices. These procedural rules must be comprehensible to everyone who
might gain access to the data, cover every aspect of the system's datahandling activities that bears on information security, and be rein76
forced by realistic penalties for noncompliance.
"Careful hiring practices and the proper philosophical direction during
the training period can be extremely valuable in developing a cadre of
' 77
systems personnel who are sensitive to privacy considerations.
Again, this points to stringent regulation and enforcement, and necessitates a cursory discussion of some current state managed/utilized
databases and their regulation.
Current state databases offer virtually no protection to individual
privacy interests primarily because "the technological capability to collect, maintain, cross-index, and disclose vast quantities of information
about private lives has far outpaced the legal protection of privacy in
the United States. 78s Modern computer "technology permits the collection and dissemination of personal information with ease. The computerization of society has important and possibly unsettling
implications for personal privacy that invite a reexamination of the
included more than 100 of the most prominent insurance companies in the
nation.
Uniform Right, supra note 1, at 1357 n.52 (citing Privacy of Medical Records: Hearings on
H.R. 2979 and H.R. 3444 Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1063-66 (1980) (statements of Dale Tooley, Denver District
Attorney)).
75. ASSAULT, supra note 46, at 268.
76. Id. at 260 (citing Peters, Security Considerations in a Multi-ProgrammedComputer System, 30 AFIPS CoNF. PRoc. 283, 28384 (1967)).
77. Id.
78. Shattuck, supra note 62, at 993.
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still-emerging constitutional right to privacy. '79
In the midst of the right to privacy's infancy, an immense number
of state-oriented databases have emerged and are already in use. 0 An
example of a giant federal data bank is the National Crime Information
Center (NCIC), which is used both for dissemination of information
concerning the noncriminal activities of persons under surveillance by
the Secret Service and for computer-matching investigations by the federal government to detect fraud, abuse, and waste in the administration
of federal programs.8 ' It has been noted that
[tihere are many types of public records, and many of them are open to
anyone who wishes to consult them. If one buys real estate, it must be
registered. City directories list the names of individuals and businesses.
Phone books provide people's names, addresses and phone numbers.
The individual wishing to obtain a driver's license must provide identification information, sometimes even fingerprints and photographs. If
he receives income, he must make out an income tax return. His employers must report information about him to social security.
In addition, various government organizations keep their own
records. The police maintains files on individuals with whom they
come in contact. The FBI may investigate any individual for security
clearances or suspected criminal activities. The army maintains records
on all who pass through it. Schools keep records on all students. Employers maintain files on employees, and credit
agencies built up credit
82
information on individuals and businesses.

It is important to emphasize that, thus far, computerization has
been used by the federal government to achieve positive ends.
"[I]nformation systems containing sensitive data are being constructed
to facilitate important social objectives, such as better law enforcement,
faster delivery of public services, more efficient management of credit
and insurance programs, improvement of telecommunications, and
streamlining of financial activities."8 3 Some claim, however, that "these
high technology systems are also being used at an increasing rate by
large public and private agencies to enhance their control of individu79. Peck, supra note 60, at 893-94.
80. As Justice Douglas noted:
The ability of the government and private agencies to gather, retain, and catalogue information on anyone for their unfettered use raises problems concerning
the privacy and dignity of individuals. Public and private agencies are storing
more and more data. "If your name is not in the records of at least one credit
bureau, it doesn't mean that you don't rate. What it does mean is that you are
either under twenty-one or dead.
Tarver v. Smith, 402 U.S. 1000, 1000 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting H. BLACK,
Buy Now, PAY LATER 37 (1961)).
81. Shattuck, supra note 62, at 992.
82. Ruggles, supra note 36, at 212.
83. Shattuck, supra note 62, at 993.
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als, '" 4 and that "groups are seeing their privacy eroded by the increas85
ing requirements of a growing bureaucracy."
In sum, a modern society requires vast amounts of information to
function. Generally, individuals provide information because they recognize it is essential to allow society to operate safely (as in motor vehicle license information), efficiently (as in income tax information), and
effectively (as in social security information). As Arthur R. Miller once
stated:
I do not oppose data centers. I am overwhelmed by their capabilities; I
am concerned about their proliferation; but I think it is absolutely ludicrous and unrealistic to advocate the elimination of a modern technology that can carry out important governmental and nongovernmental
86
operations simply because that technology might be abused.
Pursuant to this view, what is necessary is not the destruction or prevention of federal databases but rather stringent regulatory control governing data entry and use.
Medical databases, such as the AIDS database at issue here, are
particularly sensitive and require strict governmental regulation, especially in iight of the AIDS hysteria and frequent acts of injustice and
violence towards AIDS victims. Unfortunately, "[t]hese advanced systems of recordkeeping are so new to the health care field that the legal
system has not provided health care consumers with privacy protection,
access, and accuracy rights ....-"87 Such a lack of protection to the medical consumer is especially grievous given that "the number of persons
outside the doctor-patient relationship with access to a patient's records
is reportedly 'staggering' and expected to grow." 88
A variety of factors contribute to the increase in the number of
people who gain access to medical records outside of the traditional
"doctor-patient" relationship:
Medical records now frequently include intimate details about a patient's habits or social life, such as patterns of alcohol and drug use,
sexual proclivities, and family relationships .... The rise of disease

control data for research and the requirements of government-subsidized medical care have expanded both the role and the content -of
medical records. As a result of these changes, the responsibility for
protecting and managing personal medical information has become diffused. A patient's medical information may be scattered or stored beyond the physical, administrative, and ethical control of the health care
84.
85.
86.
(1968).
87.
88.

Id.
Ruggles, supra note 36, at 213.
Miller, On Proposals and Requirements for Solutions, 53 MINN. L. REV. 224, 227
Uniform Right, supra note 1, at 1356.
Id. at 1350 (quoting PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY

IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 277, 290 (1977)).
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provider who initially created the record.8 9
Thus,
it is inevitable that personal and medical information about potential
and confirmed AIDS carriers and victims would be exposed to many
outside the doctor-patient relationship. Physicians must collect such
information in order to render adequate professional services to their
patients. Employees of state and federal public health organizations
must receive all available AIDS-related information in order to conduct
the scientific battle to contain and find a cure for the disease. Red
Cross and blood-bank employees discover AIDS cases in the course of
monitoring the nation's blood supply. Private organizations offering
legal or medical advice to AIDS carriers or establishing AIDS victim
support groups are also privy to personally identifiable AIDS-related
information. This widespread collection and possession of information
poses the danger that it will be improperly disclosed to unauthorized
9°
third parties.
"Even in states that regulate disclosure to insurers, employers, and
other private parties, the problem of unconsented-to redisclosure by
these parties to still others, is usually not addressed by statute."9 1 Once
again, these facts point to the crucial role played by regulation of data
entry and use.
2.

HOW TO REGULATE

The quest should be to develop a rational pattern of regulation to
ensure that maximum social utility is derived from computers at a minimum social cost in terms of injury to individual privacy.92 This is especially important in light of the fact that "[riecorded information always
is vulnerable to human and mechanical foibles; therefore, the most crucial regulations for assuring a high level of data security are those dealing with the information that may be gathered, the ways in which it is
manipulated, and the identity of the people to whom the data may be
93
disclosed.
Four elements have been identified as essential to efficient process94
ing regulation:
First, the unique nature of the personal data processing must be recognized. Second, requests for personal information must specify the pur89. Id. at 1352, 1353 (citing Privacy of Medical Records: Hearings on H.R. 2979 and
H.R. 3444 Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations,96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 211, 479-82 (1980); PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN
AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 282, 283, 290-91 (1977)).

90. Comment, supra note 11, at 320.
91. Uniform Right, supra note 1, at 1361 (citation omitted).
92. See Miller, supra note 86, at 227.
93. ASSAULT, supra note 46, at 263.
94. Simitis, supra note 64, at 737.
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pose for which the data will be used, thereby excluding all attempts at
multifunctional processing. Third, data protection regulations must be
reviewed and updated constantly to reflect changes in technology. Finally, there must be an independent authority to enforce data
95
regulations.
The first step towards development of a rational pattern of regulation is
to impress upon both governmental and private agencies that the collection and retrieval of personal data is an exceptional means of obtaining
information, and not the norm. Technocratic concerns, such as viewing
the computer as the ultimate convenience, should not be the controlling
factor. Priorities on information use are to be clearly set, so that the
burden is on the user to show his need. 96 Additional protective measures are also in order:
Hardware and software should, like motor vehicles or medicine, meet
certain safety requirements before being put on the market. They
should have a minimum of built-in protective devices. This requirement is by no means a utopian expectation. Smart cards and videotext
can, at least for payment purposes, be designed in a way that demands
97
almost no collection of personal data.
B.

CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS

Even if we assume that such regulation will be developed, implemented, and operated with the utmost success, the reporting of HIVpositive names and the ensuing creation of a state medical/AIDS focused database may violate certain constitutional guarantees.
The two primary constitutional concerns relating to the creation of
an AIDS database are equal protection and privacy. For the purpose of
this discussion, it will be assumed that the three tests used to identify
HIV-infected blood yield accurate results. 98
1.

The Reporting of Names of Those Who Test Seropositive May
Violate the Equal Protection99 Guaranteesof the United
States Constitution
Discriminatory treatment will generally not violate the equal pro-

95. Id. at 737-38.
96. Id. at 738-39.
97. Id. at 739-40.
98. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
99. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See, e.g., Reportability,supra note 7, at 1103. The
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause limits actions only by state, not federal
government. "The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State shall make or
enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." Id. at 1115 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1). While there is
no analogous provision applying to the federal government, the Fifth Amendment Due
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tection clause if the statutory classification meets the applicable relevancy test. The modern view of relevancy
is more sophisticated than that used in the cases ...dealing with tuberculosis and venereal disease. The decisions rendered thirty years ago
simply do not reflect the contemporary notions of constitutional protections. Some recent commentators have indicated that the courts today
are likely to apply strict scrutiny to any mandatory public health measure. Such an analysis requires the state to prove a compelling state
interest justifying the public health measure, and then to prove that
the particular regulation in question is the least restrictive alternative
to accomplish the desired end.' ° °
In order to apply strict scrutiny to statutes which require the reporting of names of those who test seropositive, gays, hemophiliacs, and
drug users would have to be deemed a suspect class, a classification usually reserved for racial groups.' 0 1 The author believes, as do other authorities, that "it is unlikely... that the Supreme Court would consider
gays, hemophiliacs, or intravenous drug users (members of the groups
considered to be a high risk for contracting AIDS) to be members of a
02
suspect classification."'
With respect to the reporting of seropositive individuals, the law is
neutral on its face, although a disproportionate number of gays,
hemophiliacs, and intravenous drug users represent the segments of the
10 4
3
population most likely to test positive.' 0 In Washington v. Davis,
Process Clause may apply. However, a Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause analysis is
beyond the scope of this Note.
100. Gray, The Parametersof Mandatory Public Health Measures and the AIDS Epidemic, 20 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 505, 516-17 [hereinafter Parameters](citing Note, The ConstitutionalRights of AIDS Carriers,99 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1282-84 (1986)).
101. Religion has not even been treated as a suspect class. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 16-13, at 1465 (2d ed. 1988). See also United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (where, to effect the delineation
of voting districts, strict scrutiny was applied to nonwhites (blacks and Puerto Ricans),
but was not considered, even in dicta, in relation to the Hasidic community, a religious
minority).
102. Parameters,supra note 100, at 517. See also Bowers V. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986) (denying that the right to engage in homosexual sodomy is fundamental).
103. According to the American Red Cross:
About 98 percent of all AIDS cases reported to date have occurred in the following groups:
Sexually active homosexuals and bisexual men (or men who have had sex
with another man since 1977) (65 percent)
Present or past users of illegal intravenous (IV) drugs (17 percent)
Homosexual and bisexual men who are also IV drug abusers (8 percent)
Persons who have had transfusions of blood or blood products (2 percent)
Persons with hemophilia or other blood clotting disorders who have received
blood clotting factors (1 percent)
Heterosexual men and women (these include sex partners of persons with
AIDS or at risk for AIDS, and people born in countries where heterosexual
transmission is thought to be more common than in the United States (4 percent)
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two black applicants challenged a Police Department's recruiting process, and more particularly, a written test given to all prospective Government employees because it excluded a disproportionately high
number of black candidates. The Court held that the test was valid because the ends it was created to achieve were rationally related to a
constitutionally permissible state interest.
Similarly, given that a disproportionate number of gays,
hemophiliacs, and intravenous drug users will be affected by any statute
that requires the reporting of the names of seropositive individuals, the
test to determine whether the statute violates the Equal Protection
Clause is whether the reporting of seropositive names is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. First, the legitimate state interest is
the preservation of public health. As was previously discussed, recording of names into a state database would enable contact tracing of those
who test seropositive, an event that has a relatively short incubation period. This would allow many victims, otherwise unaware of their infected status, to receive treatment early, thereby hindering the
progression of the disease. While
[t]here are few absolutes or universal truths to be gleaned from the
available precedent in the area of mandatory public health measures,
[it] appears beyond cavil that the state, in the exercise of its innate police power, has the authority to impose reasonable compulsory requirements to protect the general public from an epidemic. When the courts
are called upon to consider the validity of compulsory public health
measures directed at the AIDS epidemic, the inquiry-regardless of the
level of scrutiny-will be whether the courts can conclude that the
10 5
measure is reasonable.
Thus, courts must ultimately ask whether reporting seropositive
names is a reasonable measure related to the control of AIDS.
In determining "reasonableness," courts generally balance the injury
inflicted against the benefits obtained. The ability to articulate a noble
objective, such as the preservation of public health, is, of course, insufficient. The proffered measure must, as a matter of reasonable medical
certainty, afford protection to the public health.1° 6
"A measure that is designed to merely curtail the unsupported fear of
the community will probably not be seen as a sufficiently compelling
-

Infants born to mothers infected with the AIDS virus (1 percent).
AIDS, SEX, AND YOU (Oct. 1986 Brochure).
104. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).

AMERICAN RED CROSS,

105. Parameters,supra note 100, at 518.
106. Id. at 518. "In considering forced testing, quarantine, or similar measures, the appropriate test would be to weigh the degree of intrusion on personal liberties against the
degree of protection that the measure can actually give to the general populace." Id. at

517 (citing Note, The ConstitutionalRights of AIDS Carriers,99 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 128284 (1986)).
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objective."'10 7 However, as previously discussed, there are very real benefits to the early diagnosis of seropositive individuals. To briefly reiterate the main benefits: (1) AZT has been shown to dramatically slow the
progression of AIDS (i.e., the onset of ARC, or other advanced diseases
in the HIV positive individual); (2) the blood plasma from recently infected HIV positive individuals is rich in antibodies valuable to those in
the more advanced stages of AIDS, and it is theorized that perhaps
something in this plasma can "teach" the sicker patient's immune system to defend itself; (3) moreover, the newly infected HIV positive individual can be educated in hygene and safe sex, to prolong his own
existence and avoid infecting loved ones.
In response to the above, it is argued that the ELISA test is inaccurate and likely to be both under- and over-inclusive so that there is no
reasonable medical certainty that the public health would be afforded
greater protection by its widespread implementation. The author disagrees. First, the ELISA inaccuracies can be checked against two other
more accurate tests.' 08 Second, a statute can be under-inclusive and
still pass the muster of equal protection.O1 9 Also, given the geometric
progression of the disease, it is vital to track the sexually active person
in order to prevent harm to many others.
The over-inclusive nature of the ELISA test presents a tougher
problem; the other two antibody tests do not correct for this flaw. As a
result, the burden falls upon uninfected individuals who test positive.
Ultimately, their privacy must be sacrificied in order to achieve the
greater good. Despite this dilemma, the author believes that the possibility of tracking individuals who test positive and encouraging responsible behavior on their part, outweighs any burden placed upon
uninfected persons who incorrectly test positive.
2.

The Reporting of Seropositive Names May Violate the Privacy
Guarantees of the United States Constitution,Especially in
Light of the High Costs of Information Abuse'1 0

First, it is important to understand the modern concept of a "right
to privacy." Professor Kurland has identified three rights within the
concept of privacy: "freedom from intrusion or observation in one's pri107. Id. at 518-19 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 448
(1985) (unsubstantiated negative attitudes or fears are not permissible bases for treating
home for mentally retarded differently from other multiple dwellings in zoning
proceeding)).

108. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
110. See, e.g., Closen, Connoy, Kaufman & Woscik, AIDS: Testing DemocracyIrrationalResponses to the Public Health Crises and the Need for Privacy in Serologic
Testing, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 835 (1986).
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vate affairs; the right to maintain control over certain personal information; and the freedom to act without outside interference."'' An AIDS
database would arguably infringe on all three facets of privacy, as sexual habits would be exposed, recorded in the databank, and tracked to
see if the AIDS carrier is acting responsibly. Similarly, "Dean Prosser,
who took up the Warren-Brandeis cause of establishing privacy as a
tort, gave it a four-part definition: (1) intrusion into solitude or personal affairs; (2) public disclosure of embarrassing facts; (3) publicity
that puts one in a false light; or (4) appropriation by another of one's
i2
name or likeness.""1
With respect to Prosser's definition, elements one
and two of privacy are potentially' infringed by the creation of a
database.
Whether the courts protect the right to privacy in the computer
technology context is uncertain.
In 1977, the Supreme Court, in Whalen v. Roe, 113 demonstrated great

sensitivity to the privacy needs of an information-based society in upholding a statute that required that centralized computer records be
maintained on all persons who purchased certain lawfully prescribed
drugs for which there also was an illicit market. The statute at issue
required that a system be established to protect the records against disclosure, and that data be destroyed after five years. In addition, public
disclosure of a patient's identity was expressly prohibited. The Court
found that the security precautions required by the statute sufficiently
protected information against l disclosure
and thus did not violate the
4
constitutional right to privacy."
The Wrhalen Court stated:
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in computerized
databanks ....The collection of taxes, the distribution of welfare and
social security benefits, the supervision of public health, the direction
of our Armed Forces, and the enforcement of the criminal laws all require the orderly preservation of great quantities of information, much
of which is personal
in character and potentially embarrassing or
i 5
harmful if disclosed."
Unfortunately, legal precedent is hazy in this area and technology
makes us continually redetermine the boundaries of privacy.
111. Peck, supra note 60, 899-900 (citing Kurland, The Private I, U. CHI. MAG., Autumn 1976, at 7, 8). "Invasion of privacy as a separate and distinct tort only emerged at
the end of the nineteenth century." Epstein, Privacy, PropertyRights, and Misrepresentations, 12 GA. L. REV. 455, 463 (1978) [hereinafter Misrepresentations].
112. Peck, supra note 60, at 900 n.36 (citing Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389
(1960)).
113. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
114. Peck, supra note 60, at 907-08.
115. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605 (citation omitted).
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The constitutional problem concerning the protection of privacy is the
difficulty of applying the principles of an eighteenth-century document,
the Bill of Rights, to late twentieth-century life. The fourth amendment to the Constitution was adopted to protect 'persons, houses, papers and effects' against unreasonable search and seizure by the
government. Massive collection and dissemination of sensitive personal
information by private entities was unimagined at that time because
personal information was difficult to collect
and files were handwrit6
ten, rarely reproduced, and easily lost."

In contrast, "[t]oday, the capacity to collect and preserve information
has been radically altered by the relentless growth of an information
technology that permits virtually unlimited permanent storage and retrieval of personal information."' i i 7 Furthermore,
] [m]ost personal information is now maintained outside the home and
therefore generally falls outside fourth amendment protection. Individuals have almost no dominion over such information. They cannot
prevent if from being collected; they often have no access to it and thus
cannot challenge its accuracy; and they cannot prevent its dissemination. As a result, what once was gossip today may become part of the
permanent record.118
Many view privacy as a vital ingredient for creative achievement
and civic experimentation," i 9 while others consider privacy to be central
to human dignity and existence.1 20 Privacy has also been likened to the
116. Shattuck, supra note 62, at 995 (citing J. SHATrUCK, RIGHTs OF PRIVACY 4-5
(1977)).
117. Id.
118. Id. (citing Oversight of Computer Matching to Detect Fraud and Mismanagement
in Government Programs:Hearings before the Subcomm on Oversight of Gov't Mgmt. of
the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1551-56 (1982) (testimony of Ronald Plesser)).
119. Peck, supra note 60, at 898.
The chilling effect of a loss of privacy is the undesirable incentive to conform to
perceived societal norms rather than assert one's individuality in ways that may
threaten to cause a loss in personal or professional associations. Ultimately, what
will be lost by this process are the private emotional releases that we all need,
the range of human relationships that help us function, and, perhaps most importantly, the creativity that serves human achievement.
Id. at 898-99.
120. Id. at 898.
The right to privacy is more than just a vague concept. To disparage this right is
to disparage the personal autonomy that has flourished as a result of this nation's
dedication to individual rights and the related concept of human dignity. While
some have asserted that people have nothing to fear unless they have something
to hide, protection against unwarranted intrusions into personal matters means
much more than safety from minor embarrassments, or even possible incrimination. Invasions of privacy have the potential to reveal one's associations, private
enjoyments, or personal views, all of which others might look upon with a disdain leading to social ostracism.
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right one has in the autonomy of his person and creations
12 2
been touted as the primary prerequisite to true liberty.

21

and has

a. Privacy and Economic Theory:
Economic theory has been construed to limit the right to privacy
despite its aforementioned attributes. Economists have shown that, in
certain instances, the enforcement of one's right to privacy lends legal
123
ability to an individual to misrepresent himself.
As noted by one psychologist: "the wish for privacy expresses a desire... to control others' perceptions and beliefs vis-A-vis the self-concealing person."'1 24 "Even the strongest defenders of privacy describe
the individual's right to privacy as the right to 'control information
about him.' "125
However, the "seldom-remarked corollary to a right to misrepresent one's character is that others have a legitimate interest in unmasking the deception.' 126 Specifically, with regard to this analysis,
prospective employers, insurers, doctors, and lovers have a legitimate
interest in knowing that an individual has AIDS. To some, this corollary suggests that personal disclosure has value and, therefore, the
owner of the information should be able to bargain for the sale of this
information. 12 7 However, whether such a solution is feasible depends
121.

See, e.g., Simitis, supra note 64.

[T]he protection afforded to thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, expressed
through the medium of writing or of the arts ... is merely an instance of the
enforcement of the more general rights of the individual to be let alone. It is like
the right not to be assaulted or beaten, the right not to be imprisoned, the right
not to be maliciously prosecuted, the right not to be defamed.
Id. at 730-31 (quoting Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205
(1890)).
122. "La libert6 du people est dans sav vie priv~e; ne la troublez point. Que le
gouvernement... ne soit une force que pour prothger cet 6tat de simplicit6 contre la force
mfme." Id. at 730 (quoting de Saint-Just, Fragments our les institutions r6publicaines,in
2 OEUVRES CoMPLkrmEs 492, 507 (C. Vellay ed. 1908) ("The liberty of the people lies in
their private lives; do not disturb it. Let the government.. be a force only to protect this
state of simplicity against force itself ....
)).
123. "Psychologists and sociologists have pointed out that even in everyday life people
try to manipulate by misrepresentation other peoples' opinion of them." Posner, The
Right to Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 395 (1978) [hereinafter Right of Privacy] (citing E.
GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 58 (1959)).
124. Id. (quoting Jourard, Some Psychological Aspects of Privacy, 31 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBs. 307, 307 (1966)).
125. Id. at 395 (quoting Stone, The Scope of the Fourth Amendment: Privacy and the
Police Use of Spies, Secret Agents, and Informers, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1193, 1207).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 397.
That disclosure of personal information is resisted by, i.e., is costly, to the person
to whom the information pertains yet is valuable to others may seem to argue for

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. X

upon: "(1) the 8nature and provenance of the information and (2) trans2
action

costS.'

1

Arguably, it is not appropriate for an AIDS carrier to be allowed to
conceal his condition from insurance companies because without this information the insurance company cannot conduct proper actuarial calculations or assess accurate and profitable premiums. In response, some
argue that it is better to spread the cost of AIDS care throughout society rather than to deprive the AIDS victim of insurance because of exorbitant premiums or outright refusal. If the general populace desires
the costs to be so spread, a government run or subsidized insurance program should be founded, rather than to fortuitously place the burden of
AIDS-related costs upon individual insurers.
Thus, a line drawing problem arises with regard to when maintaining secrecy about one's AIDS status becomes an act of fraud upon the
individual's financial/sexual/medical partner(s).
One consideration relevant to deciding whether a transacting party has
crossed the line is whether the information he seeks to conceal is a
product of significant investment. If not, the social costs of disclosure,
which... arise from the effect of disclosure in dampening the incentive
to invest in information gathering, will be low. This consideration may
be decisive on the question, for example, whether the law should require the owner of a house to disclose latent, i.e., nonobvious, defects to
a purchaser. The ownership and maintenance of a house are, of course,
productive activities in which it is costly to engage. But the owner acquires knowledge of the defects of his house costlessly or nearly so;
hence forcing him to disclose those defects will not reduce his incentive
129
to invest in discovering them.
Thus, if the HIV positive individual gains this information through the
regular course of his healthcare, then forcing him to disclose his disease
should not reduce his incentive to be tested for AIDS. This brings us to
an argument frequently made by advocates against reporting: If the
names of seropositive individuals are reported, then individuals who
suspect themselves to be HIV positive will be deterred from obtaining
medical care. As a result, these individuals might suscribe to medical
quackery, rather than to orthodox medical care. This would eliminate
the gains that reporting is intended to produce, such as early treatment
giving people property rights in information about themselves and letting them
sell those rights freely. The process of voluntary exchange would then assure
that the information was put to its most valuable use....
The interest in encouraging investment in the production of socially valuable
information presents the strongest case for granting property rights in secrets.
This is the economic rationale for according legal protection to the variety of
commercial ideas, plans, and information encompassed by the term 'trade secret.'

Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 398 (citations omitted).
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with AZT and potential blood plasma donations for other AIDS patients. However, by educating the general populace and increasing their
understanding and tolerance of AIDS, HIV individuals will be encouraged to seek the benefits of early treatment, regardless of their
fears of becoming an officially documented case.
Another economic argument in support of database reporting balances the value of secrecy to the infected party against the value of
knowledge to the community wherein the infected party interacts.
Consider, for example.
whether the law should allow a magazine to
sell its subscriber list to another magazine without obtaining the subscriber's consent ....
The costs of obtaining subscriber approval
would be high relative to the value of the list. If, therefore, we believe
that these lists are generally worth more to the purchasers than being
shielded from possible unwanted solicitations is worth to the subscriber, we should assign the property right to the magazine; and the
law does this.130
Similarly, if the knowledge that an individual is HIV positive is worth
more to the individual's medical/financial/sexual partners than secrecy
is to the individual, the right to the information should be assigned to
the medical/financial/sexual partners.

Knowledge concerning one's medical condition is arguably far more
harmful to the ill person than the inclusion of one's name on a magazine subscription list. Yet, there are still good reasons to assign the
property right away from the seropositive individual.
Much of the demand for privacy... concerns discreditable information,
often information concerning past or present criminal activity or moral
conduct at variance with a person's professed moral standards. And
often the motive for concealment is, as suggested earlier, to mislead
those with whom he transacts. Other private information that people
wish to conceal, while not strictly discreditable, would, if revealed, correct misapprehensions that the individual is trying to exploit, as when a
worker conceals a serious health problem from his employer or a prospective husband conceals his sterility from his fiancee. It is not clear
why society should assign the property right in such information to the
individual to whom it pertains; and the common law.., generally does
not.
An analogy to the world of commerce may help explain why people should not-on economic grounds, in any event-have right to conceal material facts about themselves. We think it is wrong (and
inefficient) that the law should permit a seller in hawking his wares to
make false or incomplete representations as to their quality. But people "sell" themselves as well as their goods. They profess high standards of behavior in order to induce others to engage in social or
130. Id. at 398 (citing Shibley v. Time, Inc., 45 Ohio App. 2d 69, 341 N.E.2d 337 (1975)).
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business dealings with them from which they derive an advantage but
at the same time they conceal some of the facts that these acquaintances would find useful in forming an accurate picture of their character. There are practical reasons for not imposing a general duty of full
and frank disclosure of one's material personal shortcomings--a duty
not to be hypocrite. But everyone should be allowed to protect himself
from disadvantageous transactions by ferreting out concealed facts
about individuals which are material to the representations (implicit or
explicit) that those individuals make concerning their moral
131
qualities.
With respect to having AIDS or testing seropositive for AIDS, a
deadly and financially crippling disease, surely this is a material fact of
which a prospective partner should be aware-whether this be a sexual
partner or a financial partner (employer or insurer).
It is no answer that such individuals have "the right to be let alone."
Very few people want to be let alone. They want to manipulate the
world around them by selective disclosure of facts about themselves.
Why should others be asked to take their self-serving claims at face
value and be prevented from obtaining the information necessary to
132
verify or disprove these claims?
Opponents of AIDS databases would urge that there are less intrusive alternatives. While this may be true in the sexual context (as in
encouraging the entire populace to engage only in safe sex), this is not
likely to be true in the financial context unless a system is created to
defray the financial drain away from insurers and employers to society
at large.
In general, there are two forces which combine in the economic arguments pertaining to privacy.
The two main strands of the argument-related to personal facts and
to communications--can be joined by remarking the difference in this
context between ends and means. With regards to ends there is a
prima facie case for assigning the property right in a secret that is a byproduct of socially productive activity to the individual if its compelled
disclosure would impair the incentives to engage in that activity; but
there is a prima facie case for assigning the property right away from
the individual where secrecy would reduce the social product by mis133
leading people with whom he deals.
This economic argument leads to dramatic results:
the protections of trade and business secrets by which businessmen exploit their superior knowledge or skills (applied to the personal level,
131. Id. at 399-400.
132. Id. at 400 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)).
133. Id. at 403. In other words, "Reticence is generally a means rather than an end."
Id. at 400.
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as it should be, the principle would, for example, entitle the social host
or hostess to conceal the recipe of a successful dinner) ... (and] . . .
generally no protection for facts about people-my ill health, evil temper, even my income would not be facts over which I had property

rights ....

134

To overcome these drastic results many would turn to some philosophical or moral notion to preserve privacy rights over material facts concerning one's body. However,
moral theory may be quite powerful when it insists that every person
owns his own body, but it is vastly weaker when it makes the claim of
ownership with respect to the control of information about that body.
Within this void the economic theories of property rights are of some
assistance because they point toward a private assignment of rights to
information that is the product of individual effort and initiative and
1 35
toward a public assignment of rights to newsworthy events.
Here, testing seropositive for AIDS would be deemed a newsworthy
event and not the result of some unique individual effort or achievement. Furthermore, many support this result against privacy over
newsworthy events for noneconomic rationales.1i s
The primary fear of reporting names seems to be that those who
receive the information will abuse it, perhaps even in a physically violent sense.
This suppression of information is unwarranted, even if the person who
hears it might misuse or misinterpret it. Persons should normally be
told the truth. Society does not imprison individuals who are likely to
make foolish or irrational decisions. So, too, it should not countenance
l3 7
their belief that they are incapable of handling the truth.
Thus, despite the incredible intolerance frequently displayed toward
vulnerable AIDS carriers, and despite the potential loss of job, medical
treatment, insurance, and funds, many would urge that there is no privacy right whatsoever in the status of an HIV test. In support of this
conclusion, it is important to note that
[m]isrepresentation ... is not a criminal matter, but a civil matter between two private parties. And in this context, the individual who is
asked to risk his property and his reputation [in this instance referring
to the non-AIDS infected individual] should not have his freedom compromised solely to advance the private interests of others .... Assume
the possibility that he will misuse or misinterpret the information is
real. It does not justify a suppression of the information (that in itself
can be subject to abuse) but a disclosure of the information coupled
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 404.
Misrepresentations,supra note 111, at 465.
Id. at 466.
Id. at 470-71.
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with explanation about its import and effect.'

Thus, from an economic standpoint, not only should names be reported to a database, but access to this database should be a virtual freefor-all. The author believes this conclusion wholly ignores the needs of
already struggling AIDS victims, and would, instead, advocate a system
of stringent regulation that would protect reported names and permit
only limited access to the names. The author also believes that education and a system of public welfare are needed to combat the hostile reaction to, and isolation of, AIDS carriers, and to support and insure
AIDS victims.
IV.

EDUCATION AND PUBLIC INSURANCE
FOR AIDS CARRIERS

As the preceding discussion indicates, a strong case can be made for
the reporting of seropositive names into a state database. However, the
author supports such reporting only to the extent that the database is
created in conjunction with a public insurance system for AIDS victims
and a massive educational program for the general populace.
A.

PUBLIC INSURANCE

AIDS is a unique problem because it (1) ultimately prohibits a person from being financially self-supportive, due to extensive sick-leaves;
(2) is transmittable and fatal, thus leading to social isolation for many of
its victims and further loss of financial support; and (3) is a disease for
which the only partially effective drug, AZT, can cost in excess of
$10,000 per year, not including any other medical costs. To date, victims, over-burdened hospitals, and insurance companies have divided up
the financial whirlpool resulting from virtually every seropositive case.
Dollars are scarce and many victims, who are forced to leave the workplace because of the unexpected illness, find themselves adjusting from
once self-supportive lifestyles to a meager welfare existence, while they
literally await a socially isolated death in a barren apartment or overcrowded hospital facility. These conditions are intolerable in a country
which has stressed human dignity and freedom. It is essential, therefore, that some support system be designed to finance AIDS' health
care, or, at the very least, to ease the financial worry of a victim's last
period of life. One argument levied against such a system is that it
would entail a financial cost to society which some members, probably
those least at risk, would prefer not to pay or would prefer to transfer
to other needy causes. However, unlike many other causes, the financial costs of AIDS to society already exist in dollar form, albeit some138. Id. at 472-73.
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what obscured by the fact that the costs filter through the insurance
industry to policy holders and to health care consumers through increased rates meant to subsidize the drain caused by impoverished
AIDS patients. A public insurance system would be a means of spreading preexisting costs throughout society. While the set-up and bureaucratic costs of such a system would be high, given the extensive nature
of the epidemic, these transaction costs could be amortized over a long
period of time to reduce the initial impact. Such a system would also
help ameliorate the financial havoc which could arise in conjunction
with the reporting of seropositive names, should employers and insurers
attain legal access to the database.
B.

EDUCATION

Much has been written and broadcast about AIDS that explains in detail who is and isn't at risk and how the disease is transmitted. Yet, for
many people, little seems to have sunk in. A public-housing official in
Rochester, N.Y., tried unsuccessfully to evict a man who was giving
shelter to an AIDS victim; the official claimed that the apartment complex was endangered. When a maintenance man did work on the tenant's toilet, he wore a World War II mask, tall fishing boots, and rubber
13 9
gloves.

Apparently education has been, for the most part, ineffective.
Uninfected individuals refuse to recognize the limited manner in which
AIDS can be transmitted. The attitude which seems to prevail is a legitimate, bottom-line oriented, "why take the risk at all" attitude. This attitude is compounded by the public's distrust of what government
leaders tell them.
The government told us nuclear power was nothing to worry about,
and then you have Three Mile Island. The government puts its best
minds at NASA, and then you have the Challenger space-shuttle disasAnd now, researchers and health care workers are contracting
ter ....
the AIDS virus. People wonder how much the government really
knows.

140

Thus, the first problem educators face is how to gain the respect of the
people they are trying to educate. Former Surgeon General, C. Everett
Koop, was unsuccessful in his attempt to gain this respect via cable television specials and an array of press releases. Contributing to the problem is the fact that current education strategies often focus on generic
how-to-avoid-the-disease themes, rather than avoidance's corollary, how
to treat and handle seropositive and AIDS patients. Consequently, education is much more likely to effect sexual habits before it helps the
139. Wall St. J., Nov. 13, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
140. Id (quoting Lester Lave, economist specializing in risk analysis at Carnegie-Mellon University in Pittsburgh).
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psychological plight of the vulnerable AIDS victim. This result is not
necessarily a negative achievement, given that the primary goal should
be to immobilize the spread of the disease. However, as "safe sex" becomes a household word, it is necessary to turn the focus of education
toward the needs of the already infected individual. Respect for both
forms of education will likely blossom as researchers enjoy more success in halting the progression of AIDS in individual patients, thereby
gaining credibility. Ultimately, education will effect not only people's
sexual practices, but also how they treat AIDS victims.
IV.

CONCLUSION

It would be naive to claim that the potential for abuse of computer
technology in the AIDS context does not exist. Despite the weaknesses
inherent in any data protection scheme, stringent regulation can help to
maintain the integrity of the AIDS carrier's medical record. Moreover,
the benefits of using such an AIDS database for epidemiological and
medical treatment purposes are substantial and support a rational basis
test for claimed violations of equal protection. With regard to privacy,
the AIDS carriers' interests are offset, at least in part, by society's interest in open and fair dealing. It is the opinion of this author that names
should be reported, if only for medical treatment purposes via contact
tracing, but that the maintenance of an AIDS database should only be
implemented in conjunction with public AIDS insurance and education
programs, so as to ameliorate a portion of the inevitable and substantial
additional burdens which may befall the AIDS carrier as a direct or indirect consequence of name reporting and database creation.
M. Nicole van Dam

